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GETTING SLAPP-ED IN FEDERAL COURT:
APPLYING STATE ANTI-SLAPP SPECIAL
MOTIONS TO DISMISS IN FEDERAL COURT
AFTER SHADY GROVE
KATELYN E. SANER†
ABSTRACT
In recent years, dozens of states have enacted anti-Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) laws to counter
SLAPP suits, or lawsuits filed to silence a defendant who has spoken
out against a plaintiff. The goal of a SLAPP suit is not to win on the
merits, but rather to discourage the defendant’s right to free speech
through the prospect of ruinously expensive litigation. State antiSLAPP laws provide for special motions to dismiss, which allow a
defendant to file an expedited motion to dispose of the SLAPP suit
before engaging in costly discovery.
It is well established that a federal court sitting in diversity applies
state substantive law and federal procedural rules. Following the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., however, it is unclear whether the
state-level anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss should apply in
federal courts. This Note discusses Shady Grove and examines how
two lower courts have struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the
context of state anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss. This Note
then proposes a more nuanced, two-pronged interpretation for
determining the applicability of state laws in federal courts. Applying
this interpretation, this Note argues that state anti-SLAPP special
motions to dismiss should apply in federal courts.

INTRODUCTION
On August 12, 2008, elementary-school principal Pat Godin filed
1
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the School Department
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Board of Directors and School Union of Fort O’Brien School in
2
Machiasport, Maine. Godin also included state claims of defamation
3
and contract interference against several individual defendants. The
complaint alleged that Godin was terminated early from her
employment contract after the school board received unsupported
4
complaints about her inappropriate conduct toward students. In
response to Godin’s § 1983 action and allegations, the individual
5
defendants moved to dismiss Godin’s claims under the special
motion procedures of Maine’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
6
Participation (anti-SLAPP) law. The Maine law, like anti-SLAPP
7
laws in twenty-eight other states, was enacted to provide expedited
review of lawsuits filed to chill defendants’ exercise of their First
8
Amendment rights.
More than three years later on August 24, 2011, multinational
corporation 3M filed a defamation lawsuit against Lanny Davis, a
prominent Washington attorney and former advisor to President
9
Clinton, and other corporate defendants. The amended complaint
alleged that Davis engaged in a smear campaign and “defamatory
10
11
media blitz” against 3M. Davis and the other defendants allegedly
published press releases claiming 3M acted dishonestly, created a
website that republished these false statements, and coordinated
12
“fake public demonstrations.” Like the individual defendants in

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
2. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 81.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 81–82.
6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
7. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.antislapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (listing the states that
have and have not enacted anti-SLAPP laws).
8. Plaintiffs file SLAPP suits to intimidate and silence a defendant who has spoken out
against or criticized the plaintiff. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. The purpose of filing
a SLAPP suit is not to win on the merits, but rather to burden the defendant with costly and
time-consuming litigation. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. In response to SLAPP
suits, many states have passed anti-SLAPP laws with special motions to dismiss (special
motions) that allow defendants to dispose of meritless lawsuits before engaging in costly
discovery. See supra note 7. For a more extensive discussion of anti-SLAPP laws, see infra Part
I.B.
9. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2012).
10. Id. at 90 (quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. at 90–91.
12. Id. at 90 (quotation marks omitted).
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Godin v. Schencks, Davis and the other defendants also moved to
dismiss under the special motion procedure of the District of
14
Columbia’s anti-SLAPP law.
These two cases hinged on the same issue: Should a federal court
15
sitting in diversity apply state law or federal law? More specifically,
can a federal court invoke the state-level anti-SLAPP special motion
to dismiss (special motion), or is the special motion trumped by a
16
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim? The special motions in Maine and the
District of Columbia are strikingly similar in that both grant
17
expedited review of the legal validity of a plaintiff’s claim. But the
cases came out differently. In Godin, the First Circuit held that the
special motion did apply in federal court: the special motion did not
conflict with Rule 12, and applying the special motion advanced
18
19
litigant equality. In 3M Co. v. Boulter, the District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the special motion did not apply in
federal court: the special motion conflicted with Rule 12, and Rule 12
20
was a valid exercise under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), as it did
21
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive state rights. The
defendants in Godin could invoke state law to quickly dismiss
22
Godin’s claims; the defendants in Boulter could not invoke state law.
These two cases are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
13. Godin v. Schenks, 629 F.3d 79, 81–82 (1st Cir. 2010).
14. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 92. The current version of the statute under which
defendants filed their motion is D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2001 & Supp. 2013).
15. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 86 (“The issue is whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and 56 preclude application of Section 556 in federal court.”); Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d
at 92 (“3M has filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ special motions to dismiss, claiming that the
Act is ultra vires and, in any event, does not apply in a federal court sitting in diversity.”).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Throughout this Note, “Rule 12” is used to refer generally to
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(d). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to the pleadings,
id., whereas a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(d) includes affidavits and limited discovery
outside the pleadings, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). For further discussion of Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(d),
see infra note 158.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 81–82, 92 (reversing the District Court of Maine and holding
that “the Maine anti-SLAPP statute must be applied”).
19. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2012).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
21. See Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d. at 110–11 (“[T]he special motion to dismiss procedure
under the [District of Columbia] [a]nti-SLAPP Act does not apply . . . .”).
22. This Note loosely refers to the District of Columbia as a “state” and refers to the
District of Columbia anti-SLAPP law as a “state law” with the recognition that the District of
Columbia is not technically a state.
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For over a century, courts have grappled with which law, state or
23
federal, to apply in federal court. It is well established that when a
state law and federal rule conflict, a federal court sitting in diversity
24
applies state substantive law and federal procedural rules. When a
state law and federal rule do not conflict, a federal court applies the
state law so long as the state law advances litigant equality and there
25
is no countervailing federal interest. What is less certain is how to
determine a conflict, and how to distinguish between substantive law
26
and procedural rules. Despite numerous cases on these questions,
the Supreme Court has not come to a consensus. The Court has
sometimes found conflict between a state law and federal rule and,
27
stressing federal uniformity, has applied the federal rule. Other
times, the Court has not found conflict and, emphasizing state
28
deference, has applied the state law. As one commentator has

23. The first Supreme Court case on this question dates back to 1842. Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
24. In broad strokes, when a state law and federal rule conflict, the federal law applies if it
is a valid exercise under the REA. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965) (“We
conclude that the adoption of Rule 4(d)(1) . . . neither exceeded the congressional mandate
embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule
is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy
of the service.”). This means that the federal rule cannot “‘abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.’” Id. at 464 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“If Congress intended to reach the issue before the district
court, and if it enacted its intention into law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that
is the end of the matter.”). If the federal rule does abridge substantive rights, the state law
applies. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (“In giving federal courts
‘cognizance’ of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the
federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create
substantive rights denied by State law.”).
25. Though this proposition may appear straightforward, there is much confusion about
how to balance litigant equality and countervailing federal interests. Whereas the Supreme
Court in Hanna v. Plumer focused on litigant equality, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–69, the Court
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), stressed
countervailing federal interests, id. at 537–38.
26. E.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. 460; Byrd, 356 U.S. 525; Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S.
99; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
27. See, e.g., Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6–9, 16 (holding that an order for physical examination
under Rule 35 conflicted with an Illinois law forbidding such physical examination and that Rule
35 applied in federal court because “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and
procedure of federal courts”).
28. See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419, 431 (holding that the federal standard for an
excessive jury verdict did not conflict with the New York standard for excessiveness and that the
New York standard applied in federal court because “Erie precludes a recovery in federal court
significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court”).
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observed, figuring out which law applies is a confusing and
29
“analytical[ly] fog[gy]” inquiry.
At the same time, determining which law applies is of great
importance to both federalism and individual rights. When a state
passes a law intended to protect its citizens, how can that law apply in
state court but not in federal court? How could the defendants in
Boulter invoke the special motion to quickly dismiss 3M’s claims in
state court but not in federal court? Even more puzzling, how can
courts reconcile the application of one state law in federal court, but
not a nearly identical state law in another federal court? How could
the defendants in Godin invoke the special motion in federal court,
but not the defendants in Boulter?
Rather than clarify these questions, the most recent Court case
on this issue has only added to the confusion. In Shady Grove
30
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Justices
built upon existing precedent and set forth three different opinions—
Justice Scalia’s plurality, Justice Stevens’s concurrence, and Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent—for determining which law applies in federal
31
court. Unsure about the divergent frameworks in the three opinions,
lower courts—like the First Circuit in Godin and the District Court
for the District of Columbia in Boulter—have invoked different
32
approaches and come to different conclusions. In an effort to shed
light on and eradicate this confusion, this Note draws from the three
opinions in Shady Grove and proposes a more nuanced, two-pronged
interpretation for determining the applicability of state laws in federal
courts sitting in diversity. This Note then applies this interpretation to
state anti-SLAPP special motions and concludes that such special
motions should apply in federal court.
Although many scholars have commented on the applicability of
33
state laws in federal courts and recognized that the three opinions in

29. Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the Confusion—but
Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1208 (2011).
30. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
31. See infra Part II. As discussed within, Justice Scalia’s opinion commanded a majority in
some parts and a plurality in others. See infra note 108.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See generally, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(1974); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008).
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34

Shady Grove are confusing, only a handful have proposed a more
35
workable approach. The few scholars who have pressed further have
not applied their respective interpretations to an existing conflict
between a federal rule and state law. More specifically, no scholar has
considered state anti-SLAPP special motions and their applicability in
36
federal courts after Shady Grove.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly explains SLAPP
suits and state anti-SLAPP laws. Part II discusses Shady Grove and
the Justices’ three different approaches for determining which law
applies in federal court. Part III examines how two lower courts, the
First Circuit and District Court for the District of Columbia, have
struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the context of state antiSLAPP special motions.
Shifting from the descriptive to the normative, Part IV draws
from the Justices’ three opinions in Shady Grove and proposes a
more nuanced, two-pronged interpretation for determining the
applicability of state laws in federal courts. When faced with a
competing federal rule and state law, courts should first broadly
construe the issue before the court and compare, side by side, the text
of the federal rule and state law. If the federal rule leaves no
operation for the state law, as is often the case, the court should find
that the federal rule and state law conflict. Second, in considering
whether the federal rule is valid under the REA, the court should
37
give teeth to the substantive-rights proviso of the REA and fully
38
consider the state’s purpose in enacting the law. The state interest

34. See Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1208 (“At the end of the day, Shady Grove generates
much heat but sheds little light . . . .”).
35. See generally Stephen R. Brown, For Lack of a Better Rule: Using the Concept of
Transsubtantivity To Solve the Erie Problem in Shady Grove, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Doernberg, supra note 29; Jeffrey Redfern, Federal “Procedural” Rules Undermine Important
State Interests in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431 (2010), 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393 (2011); see also infra note 38.
36. There is one published article on state anti-SLAPP laws and their general applicability
in federal court; however, this article is from 2008 and is pre–Shady Grove. See Lisa Litwiller, A
SLAPP in the Face: Why Principles of Federalism Suggest that Federal District Courts Should
Stop Turning the Other Cheek, 1 J. CT. INNOVOVATION 67 (2008).
37. The substantive-rights proviso of the REA refers to the text of the REA stipulating
that the federal rule “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) (2006).
38. Among others, Professors Joseph P. Bauer and Jeffrey Redfern have argued that Shady
Grove overstated the federal interest and failed to give sufficient weight to the state interest. See
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from
a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 960 (2011) (arguing that the majority in
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should weigh heavily, especially when the state has a compelling
rationale for protecting its citizenry; however, the state interest
should also balance with the desire for a uniform system of federal
procedure.
Embedded in Part IV is an application of this new interpretation
to state anti-SLAPP special motions. Courts should deem that Rule
12 conflicts with the special motions, and, in balancing state and
federal interests, Rule 12 impermissibly violates substantive state
rights. State anti-SLAPP special motions should thus apply in federal
courts sitting in diversity.
I. SLAPP SUITS AND ANTI-SLAPP LAWS
To understand how state anti-SLAPP special motions interact
with Rule 12, it is imperative to first understand what a SLAPP suit is,
and why and how state legislatures have worked to counteract them.
This Part briefly discusses the history of SLAPP suits and the core
provision of state anti-SLAPP laws: the special motion. This Part also
details the Maine and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP laws, the
state laws at issue in Godin and Boulter.
A. SLAPP Suits
SLAPP suits, or Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,
are not like traditional lawsuits, in which the goal is to obtain a legal
or equitable remedy. First defined in 1988 by Professors Penelope
39
Canan and George Pring, SLAPP suits are filed with the intention of

Shady Grove went astray by “failing properly to identify and consider [the] state interests, as
well as by overstating the federal interests at stake”); Redfern, supra note 35, at 402–03 (“A
Federal Rule should not be applied in a case where it interferes with a state’s legitimate ability
to regulate the conduct of its own citizens.”).
39. Professors Canan and Pring studied SLAPP suits throughout the 1980s and in 1988
published an article that “empirically test[ed] for the first time the prevailing political and
judicial assumptions that SLAPPs ‘chill,’ or deter, citizen participation.” Penelope Canan &
George W. Pring, Research Note, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC. REV. 385, 386 (1988). In this
article, Canan and Pring define SLAPP suits as: (1) “a civil claim for monetary damages,” (2)
“filed against nongovernmental individuals and institutions,” (3) “based on advocacy before a
government branch official or the electorate, and,” (4) “on a substantive issue of some public or
societal significance.” Id. at 387 (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted). Several scholars have
questioned this definition of SLAPP suits. See Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W.L. REV. 399, 401 (1993)
(contending that Professors Canan and Pring’s definition is too restrictive); Thomas A.
Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weakness in First Amendment Law and in the Courts’
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intimidating the defendant with costly and time-consuming
40
litigation. The intention is not to win, but rather to discourage the
41
defendant through the prospect of ruinously expensive litigation. As
one commentator has noted, “[I]t is through the legal process itself—
dragging the unwitting target through the churning waters of
42
litigation—that the SLAPP filer prevails.”
Given this objective, the typical SLAPP suit occurs after a
43
defendant has spoken out against or criticized a plaintiff. Shifting
44
from the political arena to the judicial forum, the angered plaintiff
45
then files a lawsuit against the defendant. For example, a developer
might sue a local resident who has voted against the developer’s
zoning-board approval, or a candidate running for office might sue a
vehement opponent. Or, as in Boulter, a large multinational company
46
might sue to silence the dissenting media. In the prototypical SLAPP
suit, a plaintiff usually seeks a large—oftentimes untenable—amount
47
of damages. In a 1989 study of 228 SLAPP suits, the average
48
damages award sought was a whopping $9 million. Beyond damages,
the hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that the plaintiff’s claim almost
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979 (1992) (arguing that Professors Canan
and Pring’s definition is too expansive).
40. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”
(“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 942
(1992).
41. Id.
42. Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21
DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 221, 231 (2011).
43. Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969–70 (1999).
44. Id.
45. See Pring & Canan, supra note 40, at 946–47 (listing the four elements of a SLAPP suit
as: (1) a civil complaint or counterclaim; (2) filed against nongovernmental individuals and/or
groups; (3) because of their communication to a government body, official, or the electorate; (4)
on an issue of some public interest or concern).
46. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2012) (reciting 3M’s claim that
the defendants schemed “to extract $30 million from 3M” in part by bombarding 3M with
“sensational and false accusations . . . in the global media” (quotation marks omitted)).
47. See Cosentino, supra note 39, at 404 (“After the SLAPP is filed, citizens risk becoming
personally accountable to the plaintiff for massive damages.”); James E. Grossberg & Dee
Lord, California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, COMM. LAW, Fall 1995, at 3, 4 (“SLAPP plaintiffs
usually seek astronomical damages as part of their strategy of intimidation.”).
48. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
23, 25–26 (1989). Adjusted for inflation, this $9 million figure from 1989 is approximately $16.9
million in 2013 dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
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49

always lacks merit —the plaintiff is merely seeking to silence and
50
harass the defendant for speaking out.
51
Though the earliest SLAPP suit dates back to 1802, the advent
of the Internet as a new means for speaking out publicly has greatly
52
increased the number of SLAPP suits. There is a “growing trend of
businesses and professionals suing consumers who gripe[] about them
53
online.” For example, a towing company filed a SLAPP suit against
a college student after the student made disparaging remarks about
54
the company on Facebook.
Concurrent with the recent explosion in voicing one’s opinions
on the Internet, SLAPP suits have become highly criticized and
disfavored. First, SLAPP suits are criticized for the significant power
differential between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff is
55
typically more wealthy and can afford years of litigation, whereas
the defendant is often an ordinary “middle-class[,] . . . middle-of-the56
road American[].” As such, a SLAPP suit can deplete a defendant’s
resources. Second, SLAPP suits are criticized for threatening the core

49. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970
(9th Cir. 1999) (“The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit . . . .”); Penelope Canan &
George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 514
(1988) (remarking that SLAPP defendants win early dismissals in 68 percent of cases and win
judgments in 83 percent of cases).
50. See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1989) (“The apparent goal of SLAPPs is to stop citizens from exercising
their political rights or to punish them for having done so.”).
51. In Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802), Attorney Ebenezer Harris accused five
citizens of “devising, writing, and publishing . . . libel” to prevent his re-election for justice of the
peace and sought $5,000 in damages. Id. at 129–32. The Supreme Court of Vermont dismissed
his complaint. Id. at 147.
52. See Zoe Tillman, Getting SLAPPed: New D.C. Law Designed To Stop Suits That Use
Financial Bullying, NAT’L L. J., May 16, 2011, at 13, 16 (“‘Companies and political figures who
weren’t used to being criticized have confronted the brave new world of the Internet by trying
to shut people up.’” (quoting Paul Alan Levy, attorney with the Public Citizen Litigation
Group)).
53. Richards, supra note 42, at 224.
54. Rex Hall, Jr., Firm Sues WMU Student over Facebook Page: Towing Company Seeks
$750,000 in Damages for Online Criticism, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 14, 2010, at A6.
55. See Peter Blumberg, Intent To Chill: Four Cases Before California’s High Court Raise
the Issue of Intent on the Part of Plaintiffs Who File SLAPP Suits, S.F. DAILY JOURNAL, June 5,
2002 (“Your quintessential SLAPP suit is by a wealthy person or organization trying to defeat
the other side . . . .”).
56. Pring & Canan, supra note 40, at 940.
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rights to free expression and free access to government. One New
York trial judge has suggested that “[s]hort of a gun to the head, a
greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be
58
imagined.” Third, SLAPP suits are criticized for the onus they place
on the judicial system. The thousands of SLAPP suits filed each year
“waste judicial resources and clog the already overburdened court
59
dockets.”
Traditional defenses and procedural remedies are ineffective
60
mechanisms for resolving SLAPP suits. For example, Rule 12 and
61
Rule 56 motions are relatively useless in distinguishing a SLAPP suit
62
from a legitimate tort claim. The elements of a SLAPP suit and its
nonmeritorious nature emerge at trial, but this is only after costly
63
discovery and years of litigation. Defendants can retaliate with
64
either Rule 11 motions claiming frivolity, counterclaims, or SLAPP65
back suits, but these are also unsatisfactory. Such retaliation
typically prolongs the litigation, is costly for defendants who might
already be strapped for cash, and does little to alleviate the financial
burden of a SLAPP suit.

57. See Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 848 (2010) (noting that many state anti-SLAPP laws are grounded in the core
values of the First Amendment).
58. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App.
Div. 1994).
59. Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). The Citizen
Participation Act of 2009 was introduced in December 2009 to combat SLAPP suits on a federal
level. The Act was not passed. Bill Summary & Status: 11th Congress (2009–2010): H.R.4364,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.04364: (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
60. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Because
winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff’s primary motivation, defendants’ traditional safeguards
against meritless actions, (suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of process[ and] requests for
sanctions) are inadequate to counter SLAPPs.”).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
62. See Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 547, 552–
69 (1993) (noting the difficulty of obtaining an early dismissal or summary judgment in SLAPP
suits).
63. See Braun, supra note 43, at 972 (explaining that SLAPP suits “look like legitimate
actions”).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
65. A SLAPP-back suit is “an action whose aim is restitution for the injury of a SLAPP
suit.” Braun, supra note 43, at 990. Most often, SLAPP-back suits involve a claim of malicious
prosecution. In California, for example, “the elements of malicious prosecution are that the
prior action: (1) was commenced by or at the discretion of the defendant and was pursued to a
legal conclusion in the malicious prosecution plaintiff’s favor; (2) was brought (or continued)
without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Id.
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Prior to the enactment of anti-SLAPP laws by state legislatures,
some courts, in recognizing the ineffectiveness of traditional defenses
and procedural remedies, created judicial remedies to counteract the
silencing of protected speech and costs imposed on defendants in
SLAPP suits. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, established
a motion to dismiss in which the moving party was required to make a
66
threshold showing about the merits of her opponent’s motives.
67
Other judicial remedies included heightened pleading requirements,
shifting costs onto the plaintiff, and more stringent sanctions against
68
frivolous lawsuits. Although these judicial remedies helped reduce
the economic harm to defendants, they were piecemeal solutions that
oftentimes failed to thwart the plaintiff’s goal of intimidating the
defendant.
B. Anti-SLAPP Special Motions
To more effectively counteract the harms of SLAPP suits,
69
twenty-nine states and two territories have passed anti-SLAPP laws.
When applied, these legislative solutions are more comprehensive
and uniform than the aforementioned judicial remedies.
States enact anti-SLAPP laws with the goals of shielding
70
defendants from litigating against meritless claims and encouraging
71
protected speech. At the core of anti-SLAPP laws are special
72
motions, which provide a mechanism to prevent legal maneuvers
that burden defendants and threaten statements relating to matters of

66. Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984) (en
banc).
67. See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1976) (establishing a heightened pleading
requirement).
68. See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs,
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 407–09, 416–19 (1993) (discussing the various judicial remedies);
Cosentino, supra note 39, at 413–14 (same).
69. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2004) (“The Legislature finds and
declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.”); id. § 425.16(b)(1) (“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . shall be subject to a
special motion to strike . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., id. § 425.16(a) (“The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance . . . .”).
72. Some states refer to these “special motions to dismiss” as “motions to strike.” E.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.525 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013).
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public interest and public participation in democratic government.
Like a Rule 12 motion, a special motion allows a defendant to file an
73
expedited motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim. While the parties
74
brief the special motion, discovery is automatically stayed. In ruling
on a special motion, courts engage in a two-step analysis to determine
whether the plaintiff’s claim has merit or is merely an attempt to
silence or intimidate the defendant.
First, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the
plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s protected activities—that
is, the defendant must show that the defendant’s activities were in
furtherance of the defendant’s right to petition or free speech under
75
the federal or state constitution. For example, consider a tenant who
sues her landlord for fraud and unlawful eviction. The landlord
probably cannot prove that her activities—fraud and unlawful
76
eviction—were in furtherance of the right to petition or free speech.
Second, if the defendant meets this burden, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s claim is legally
sufficient and that each element of the plaintiff’s claim is supported
77
by admissible evidence. Many special motions also require a
heightened burden of the plaintiff demonstrating success on the

73. See generally Kristen Rasmussen, SLAPP Stick: Fighting Frivolous Lawsuits Against
Journalists, 35 NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2011, at 1 (examining the anti-SLAPP law in each
state and showing the variations among the laws); Emily Miller, Anti-SLAPP Laws on Trial:
Federal Courts Grapple with Applying State Libel Defense Laws, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/newsmedia-and-law-summer-2012/anti-slapp-laws-trial (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (delineating the
common procedures included in anti-SLAPP laws).
74. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(c).
75. See, e.g., Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Note, The Special Motion Requirements of the
Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and
Procedure, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 106–10 (2006) (describing the procedural burdens in the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law).
76. This example is drawn from Clark v. Mazgani, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24 (Ct. App. 2009). In
Clark, the landlord filed a special motion under California’s anti-SLAPP law. Id. at 26. The
lower court granted the special motion and dismissed the case, finding that the landlord’s
actions were based on her constitutionally protected rights of petition. Id. The appellate court
reversed, indicating that the landlord had “not met her threshold burden of showing this [fraud
and unlawful eviction] suit [was] based on protected activity.” Id. at 30. This example is not
illustrative of a typical SLAPP suit, in which a large, well-resourced corporation sues an
individual. However, it is instructive of the defendant’s burden of demonstrating that the
plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s protected activities.
77. See, e.g., Hoffberg, supra note 75, at 106–10 (describing the procedural burdens in the
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law).
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78

merits. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the suit continues as it
normally would, with either party free to file a Rule 12 or Rule 56
motion before advancing to trial.
Because it is notoriously difficult to distinguish a SLAPP suit
from a legitimate tort suit without costly and time-consuming
79
discovery, special motions are lauded for quickly separating
80
frivolous claims from meritorious claims. There is the risk, however,
that the plaintiff might not be able to prove the merits of her case on
the pleadings alone. Easing the potential unfairness of an automatic
discovery stay, many states permit plaintiffs to make limited discovery
81
requests.
Beyond the core provision of the special motions, the other
82
provisions in anti-SLAPP laws vary somewhat by state. In some
states, successful defendants can recover attorneys’ fees and costs,
83
while losing defendants may get an immediate appeal. Although
these provisions are important to protecting speech on matters of
public interest, they are secondary in importance to the special
motions. If the plaintiff’s claims are not dismissed at an early stage in
the litigation, there is no need to consider the possibility of attorneys’
fees or an immediate appeal. The special motion is thus the core of
state anti-SLAPP laws.

78. See Braun, supra note 43, at 994 (“For [a] claim to survive, a SLAPP filer must
demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability of success on the merits.”).
79. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
80. See Hoffberg, supra note 75, at 126 (“In a classic SLAPP suit that implicates the public
interest, the anti-SLAPP statute enhances the legal system’s receptivity to ‘petitions’ by quickly
suppressing retaliatory tort claims that merely seek to thwart the right to petition the
government for grievances.”); Marnie Stetson, Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York’s AntiSLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1356 (1995) (explaining that the procedural remedies
of New York’s anti-SLAPP law “resolve quickly whether the suit is, in fact, a SLAPP[, and i]f it
is, swift dismissal ends the chill to public participation before the filer can benefit from quieting
the opposition”).
81. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2013).
82. The scope of anti-SLAPP laws, however, varies substantially among states. California’s
anti-SLAPP law, for example, expansively protects “any written or oral statement or writing
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013). The Pennsylvania
anti-SLAPP law, on the other hand, is much narrower and protects only persons petitioning the
government about environmental issues. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301 (West 2009).
83. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(d).
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C. Anti-SLAPP Special Motions in Maine and the District of
Columbia
At issue in Godin and Boulter were the special motions to
84
85
dismiss in the Maine and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP laws.
86
87
The laws were enacted in 1995 and 2011, respectively, and broadly
encompass all written or oral statements related to issues of public
88
89
interest. As with anti-SLAPP laws in other states, the Maine and
District of Columbia laws were intended as mechanisms to prevent
legal maneuvers that burden defendants and threaten the right to
90
petition. There is little legislative history surrounding the Maine law,
but the Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public
Safety and the Judiciary reported that the District of Columbia law
was intended to “incorporat[e] substantive rights that allow a
defendant to more expeditiously, and more equitably, dispense of a
91
SLAPP.” The substantive rights refer to the “defendant’s ability to
fend off lawsuits . . . aimed to punish or prevent the expression of
92
opposing points of view.”

84. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
85. D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2001 & Supp. 2013).
86. An Act Protecting a Citizen’s Right of Petition Under the Constitution, 1995 Me. Laws
780 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556).
87. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010, 58 D.C. Reg. 741 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at D.C. CODE § 165502).
88. D.C. CODE § 16-5502; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
89. For a more extensive analysis of anti-SLAPP laws in other states, see generally Braun,
supra note 43; Sheri Coover, Note, Pennsylvania Anti-SLAPP Legislation, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 263 (2004); Hoffberg, supra note 75; Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New Anti-SLAPP
Law, 61 J. MO. B. 124 (2005); Laura Long, Note, SLAPPing Around the First Amendment: An
Analysis of Oklahoma’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and Its Implications on the Right To Petition, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 419 (2007); Edward W. McBride, Jr., Note, The Empire State SLAPPs Back:
New York’s Legislative Response to SLAPP Suits, 17 VT. L. REV. 925 (1993); Mark J. Sobczak,
Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation
Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 559 (2008); and Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public
Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663 (2011).
90. See John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection
Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning, 23 ME. B.J. 32, 34 (2008)
(“[The Maine law came] out of the legislature’s Judiciary Committee without debate or written
testimony and with the committee’s unanimous support.”).
91. Memorandum from Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of the D.C. Comm. on Public
Safety and the Judiciary, to Councilmembers, Council of D.C., Report on Bill 18-893, “AntiSLAPP Act of 2010,” at 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/
images/00001/20110120184936.pdf.
92. Id.
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At the core of both laws are the special motions. Overall, the
special motions follow the same general framework and are
representative of special motions in other states. After the defendant
93
files a special motion within a set time frame, the court prioritizes
94
the special motion and issues a ruling as quickly as possible. In
assessing the special motion, the court looks to the pleadings and
95
supporting affidavits. Discovery is automatically stayed unless good
96
cause is shown and such discovery would not be unduly burdensome.
The court first determines the threshold matter of whether the
claim at issue is based on the defendant’s exercise of her right to
97
petition. If it is, the plaintiff has an opportunity, but is not required,
to show that the claim is legally valid. Under the Maine law, the court
will grant the special motion unless the plaintiff “shows that [the
defendant’s] exercise of [the defendant’s] right of petition was devoid
of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and
98
that the [defendant’s] acts caused actual injury to the [plaintiff].”
Pursuant to the District of Columbia law, the court will grant the
special motion unless the plaintiff shows “that the claim is likely to
99
succeed on the merits.”
Although the burden language of the laws differs, the effect is
the same. Both laws, upon a defendant’s motion, shift the burden to
the plaintiff to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of her claim. For
example, take a situation in which a plaintiff files a complaint alleging
that a defendant defamed her. Under the Maine law, the plaintiff has
the burden of showing that the defendant’s statements or actions
100
were without a factual basis and caused injury to the plaintiff —the

93. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
94. The District of Columbia law requires the court to prioritize the special motion, D.C.
CODE § 16-5502(d), whereas the Maine law gives the court some discretion over this decision,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. The District of Columbia law does not have an
explicit provision for this, but the District Court for the District of Columbia has looked to
pleadings and supporting affidavits in determining whether D.C. Code § 16-5502 applies in
federal court. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 100–04 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing the
court’s procedure for handling special motions and holding that the District of Columbia’s antiSLAPP law did not apply in a federal court sitting in diversity).
96. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(c); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
97. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
98. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
99. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b).
100. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
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101

very elements of a defamation claim. In other words, the onus is on
the plaintiff to show that her defamation claim is legally valid.
Similarly, under the District of Columbia law, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing that her defamation claim is likely to succeed on
102
the merits. In other words, the effect of the two laws is the same:
both shift the burden to the plaintiff and require the plaintiff to justify
103
her claim. The anti-SLAPP laws in Maine and the District of
Columbia thus follow similar procedures and are representative of
anti-SLAPP laws in other states.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SHADY GROVE
The question of whether state or federal law applies in federal
courts sitting in diversity has perplexed courts for over a century. It is
well established that a federal court sitting in diversity applies state
104
substantive law and federal procedural rules. What is less certain is
how to distinguish between substantive law and procedural rules. The
most recent Supreme Court foray into this perplexing realm is Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. At issue
105
in Shady Grove was whether Rule 23,
which governs the
106
prerequisites for maintaining a class action, conflicts with a New
York law restricting class actions in suits seeking penalties or
107
This Part summarizes the three
statutory-minimum damages.

101. See Morgan v. Kooistra, 941 A.2d 447, 455 (Me. 2008) (“Defamation consists of: (a) a
false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third
party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication.”).
102. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b).
103. Beyond the special motions, there are three subtle distinctions between the Maine law
and the District of Columbia law. The distinctions are minor and should not lead to inferences
that the Maine and the District of Columbia laws are significantly different. First, the Maine law
permits courts discretion to give defendants more time to file a special motion, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia law sets a hard, nonnegotiable deadline,
D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a). Second, the Maine law does not require courts to dismiss special
motions with prejudice, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia
law does require dismissal with prejudice, D.C. CODE § 16-5502(d). Third, the Maine law lacks a
special motion to quash discovery orders, requests, or subpoenas which seek personal
identifying information, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia
law provides for a special motion to quash, D.C. CODE § 16-5503.
104. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
106. Id.
107. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2010).
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opinions in Shady Grove—Justice Scalia’s plurality, Justice Stevens’s
108
concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent. The three approaches
provide significant insight, but not much guidance to lower courts in
resolving whether state substantive law or federal procedural rules
apply in federal court.
A. Justice Scalia’s Really-Regulates-Procedure Approach
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia opined that the state law and
federal rule conflict, and that the federal rule applied because it
109
“really regulates procedure.” Justice Scalia first looked to whether
110
the state law and federal rule conflict. He stressed that state laws
and federal rules conflict when the text of the federal rule is
sufficiently broad—that is, when the text of the federal rule “leaves
no room for special exemptions based on the function or purpose of a
111
particular state rule.” Justice Scalia characterized the issue before
112
the Court as whether the suit could proceed as a class action. Rule
113
23 permits this, but the New York law prevents it. Thus, the laws
“undeniably” both attempt to “answer the same question” and cannot
114
operate alongside each other.
After deeming that the state law and federal rule conflict, Justice
Scalia questioned whether applying the federal rule was a valid
115
exercise of the federal rulemaking power under the REA. The REA
grants the Court “the power to prescribe general [federal] rules of
116
practice and procedure” but stipulates that federal rules shall “not
108. In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia filed an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas joined in full. Id. at 395–96. Justice Sotomayor joined parts I, II-A, II-B, and IID of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. at 396. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined. Id. at 436 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
109. Id. at 411 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1940))
(quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 398–406 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 412 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.). Justice
Stevens’s concurrence succinctly phrased this inquiry as whether the “scope of the federal rule is
‘sufficiently broad’ to ‘control the issue’ before the court, ‘thereby leaving no room for the
operation’ of seemingly conflicting state law.” Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)).
112. Id. at 398 (majority opinion).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 401.
115. Id. at 409.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
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abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Justice Scalia
interpreted a valid exercise of a federal rule under the REA as
118
meaning that the federal rule must “really regulate[] procedure.”
The substantive nature or purpose of the state law “makes no
119
difference.” Even if the state law has practical effects on a party’s
rights and remedies, the state law “regulate[s] only the process for
120
Justice Scalia stressed the ease of
enforcing those rights.”
administration and uniformity of this really-regulates-procedure
121
approach, even if it might be “hard to square” with the language of
122
the REA. Without further guidance, Justice Scalia concluded that
Rule 23 really regulates the procedure of class actions and thus is
123
valid under the REA.
B. Justice Stevens’s Sufficiently Interwoven Approach
Justice Stevens concurred with Justice Scalia’s conclusion but
disagreed with his methodology. Signing on to part of Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens agreed that the New York law
124
conflicts with Rule 23. Justice Stevens also agreed that Rule 23 was
125
a valid exercise of rulemaking authority under the REA. Criticizing
Justice Scalia’s unfaithfulness to the text of the REA, however,
Justice Stevens dismissed Justice Scalia’s really-regulates-procedure
126
approach.
Writing alone, Justice Stevens interpreted a valid exercise of
federal rulemaking as meaning that the federal rule cannot displace a
state law that is procedural but “so intertwined with a state right or
remedy that [the state law] functions to define the scope of the state-

117. Id. § 2072(b).
118. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
119. Id. at 409 (emphasis omitted).
120. Id. at 407.
121. See id. at 413 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.) (noting that
this procedural test was “driven by the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from
State to State would be chaos”).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 408–09 (plurality opinion) (implying that Rule 23, which here turns ten
thousand $500 claims into a single $5 million claim, does not substantially affect the plaintiffs’
remedies and thus “really regulates procedure”).
124. Id. at 401 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 431–36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 426–28.
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127

created right.” Beyond examining the federal rule, Justice Stevens
also looked at the substantive and extrinsic policy reasons behind the
128
state law. Justice Stevens emphasized that courts must determine
“whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of
129
substantive rights or remedies,” and that the federal rule is valid if it
130
does not intrude into these substantive rights. Justice Stevens also
131
stressed that the “bar for finding an [REA] problem is a high one”
and requires more than a “mere possibility that a federal rule would
132
133
alter a state-created right.” Without much explanation, Justice
Stevens reasoned that Rule 23 does not intrude on state substantive
rights because the New York law is not “so bound up with [a] state134
created right or remedy.” Rule 23 is thus a valid exercise of
135
rulemaking authority.
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Relatively Unguided Approach
Justice Ginsburg dissented, urging that the state law and federal
rule do not conflict, and that the state law applied because it advances
136
litigant equality. Like Justices Scalia and Stevens, Justice Ginsburg
agreed that the first question is whether the federal rule leaves no
137
room for the operation of the state law. Unlike Justices Scalia and
Stevens, however, Justice Ginsburg added a threshold inquiry—
whether conflict between the state law and federal rule is “really

127. Id. at 423.
128. See id. at 429–36 (outlining the legislative history and possible interpretations of the
New York law).
129. Id. at 419.
130. See id. at 424–25 (criticizing Justice Scalia for ignoring “the balance that Congress
struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its
own rights and remedies” and the “separation-of-powers presumption, and federalism
presumption, that counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive law”
(citations omitted)).
131. Id. at 432.
132. Id.
133. Justice Stevens did explain that although class certification could enlarge New York’s
limited damages remedy, this involved extensive speculation and thus was “just a possibility.”
Id. at 434–36.
134. Id. at 420, 434–36
135. See id. at 432 (“It is . . . hard to see how [the New York law] could be understood as a
rule that, though procedural in form, serves the function of defining New York’s rights or
remedies.”).
136. Id. at 445–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 439.

SANER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

800

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/13/2013 10:37 AM

[Vol. 63:781

138

necessary?” Embracing a “vigilant[] read[ing] [of] the Federal Rules
139
to avoid conflict with state laws,” Justice Ginsburg stressed that,
140
often, such conflict is unnecessary. After examining the text of the
federal rule and the purpose and legislative history of the New York
141
law, Justice Ginsburg found that Rule 23 and the New York law
serve different goals: Rule 23 addresses certification of class actions,
whereas the New York law focuses on remedies, specifically
142
statutory-damages caps. In avoiding conflict, Justice Ginsburg
steered away from the REA analysis into a relatively unguided Erie
143
analysis.
Under this approach, Justice Ginsburg explained that if the state
law is inseparably connected with an underlying substantive state
144
right, this strongly supports applying the state law. On the other
hand, if applying state law would alter or disrupt an essential
characteristic of the federal court system, this strongly supports
145
applying the federal rule or practice.
She also stressed the
advancement of litigant equality, or the twin aims of Erie—that is, the
138. Id. at 437
139. Id. at 439.
140. See id. at 442 (“In sum, both before and after Hanna, the above-described decisions
show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to ‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with
sensitivity to important state interests’ and a will ‘to avoid conflict with important state
regulatory policies . . . .’” (first two alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996))).
141. See id. at 437–39, 443, 448 n.7 (criticizing the plurality’s interpretation of Rule 23 as
“mechanical,” “insensitive,” and “relentless”).
142. See id. at 447 (“Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the
New York law] defines the dimensions of the claim itself.”); id. at 446 (“The Court . . . finds
conflict where none is necessary.”).
143. The phrase “relatively unguided approach” or “relatively unguided Erie analysis”
stems from an earlier case, Hanna v. Plumer. In Hanna, the Supreme Court stressed that when
there is no federal rule or statute on point, “the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice”
controls. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in
Shady Grove briefly discussed this relatively unguided approach. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg went into greater detail of this approach in Shady
Grove but did not use the phrase “relatively unguided” to describe her framework. Id. at 452–58
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 457–58 (“We have long recognized the impropriety of displacing, in a
diversity action, state-law limitations on state-created remedies.”).
145. See id. at 439 (“In our prior decisions in point, many of them not mentioned in the
Court’s opinion, we have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”); see also Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (concluding that the
constitutional right to a jury trial and the corresponding federal policy was an essential
characteristic of the federal court system that outweighed a South Carolina law requiring a
judge to decide whether an employer was immune from liability).
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federal rule should apply only when it (1) will not lead to forum
146
shopping and (2) avoids the inequitable administration of justice.
In articulating this, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly emphasized
147
“sensitivity to important state interests” and deference to state
148
Returning to the issue at hand, Justice
regulatory interests.
Ginsburg reasoned that New York had a strong interest in prohibiting
statutory damages in class actions and the New York law was
inseparably connected with these important state rights; thus, she
149
concluded the New York law should apply.
D. Unanswered Questions
The three opinions in Shady Grove leave many questions
unresolved. In determining whether the federal rule is “‘sufficiently
150
broad’ to ‘control the issue’ before the [c]ourt,” it is unclear how
broadly courts should frame the issue and construe the federal rule. It
is also unclear if courts should engage in an REA analysis, or in
Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided analysis. In an REA analysis,
there is an open question as to whether Justice Scalia’s
characterization of federal rules as procedural if they really regulate
procedure undercuts the text of the REA. There is also an open
question as to what Justice Stevens meant by his murky wording of
151
“sufficiently interwoven” with state rights.
III. TWO DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF SHADY GROVE
This lack of guidance has resulted in a hodgepodge of rulings by
152
lower courts. Some lower courts have deemed that federal rules and
state laws conflict and have adhered to Justice Scalia’s really-

146. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
federal courts must “apply state law when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and
yield markedly disparate litigation outcomes”).
147. Id. at 442 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)).
148. See id. at 438–43 (listing past decisions in which the Supreme Court deferred to state
interests).
149. See id. 452–58 (describing New York’s numerous state interests).
150. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S.
1, 4–5 (1987)).
151. Id. at 429.
152. See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year Later, Shady
Grove’s Meaning Remains Unclear, ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 75, 78–80 (summarizing how
lower courts have reached different conclusions in cases involving similar facts).
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153

regulates-procedure approach, whereas others have followed Justice
154
Stevens’s sufficiently interwoven approach.
Still others have
effectively embraced Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided approach
155
and avoided finding conflict. This Part examines how two lower
courts, the First Circuit and the District Court for the District of
Columbia, have struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the
156
context of state anti-SLAPP laws. Faced with the same legal
question and a nearly identical state law, the two courts latched on to
different approaches and came to different conclusions in interpreting
Shady Grove.
A. Godin v. Schencks
The First Circuit in Godin declined to follow Justice Scalia’s
really-regulates-procedure approach or Justice Stevens’s sufficiently
interwoven approach in Shady Grove and instead drew from Justice
157
Ginsburg’s relatively unguided approach to hold that Maine’s anti-

153. See, e.g., Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding
conflict and examining the purposes of the federal rule); Durmishi v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 720 F.
Supp. 2d 862, 876–77 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same).
154. See, e.g., Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 983–85 (10th Cir.
2010) (finding conflict and examining the purposes of the state law); Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752
F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (same).
155. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding
no conflict); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1278–80 (10th Cir. 2011) (same).
156. The District Court for the District of Columbia also examined this issue in Sherrod v.
Breitbart, 843 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2012). The defendant’s special motion was denied, and the
court held that the anti-SLAPP law was substantive and thus applicable in federal court. Id. at
85–86. The analysis was limited; the judge provided only a “statement of reasons” to explain his
ruling. Id. at 84 & n.2. A few other courts have also considered this issue in the context of state
anti-SLAPP laws, albeit with less analysis than the First Circuit or the District Court for the
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013);
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999); La. Crisis Assistance
Ctr. v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 827 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. La. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 878
F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. La. 2012); Trudeau v. ConsumerAffairs.com, Inc., No. 10 C 7193, 2011
WL 3898041 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2011); Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, No.
10 C 6682, 2011 WL 2182106 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011).
157. The First Circuit did not explicitly follow Justice Ginsburg’s approach but shared her
reluctance to find unnecessary conflict amongst federal rules and state laws. See Godin v.
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We conclude that neither [Rule] 12(b)(6) nor [Rule]
56, on a straightforward reading of its language, was meant to control the particular issues under
Section 556 before the district court. Given this result we do not reach the next level question as
to whether Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 comply with the Rules Enabling Act.”). Like Justice
Ginsburg, the court also looked to past cases and history in finding no conflict. Id. at 88.
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158

SLAPP special motion does not conflict with Rule 12 and that the
special motion should apply in federal court, as it advances litigant
159
equality.
Like Justice Ginsburg’s narrow reading of Rule 23 in Shady
Grove, the court narrowly read Rule 12 to avoid conflict with the
special motion. Looking beyond the text of the anti-SLAPP law to its
purpose and legislative history, the court found that the special
motion applies to pretrial dispositions of claims based on a
160
defendant’s petitioning activity. Rule 12, on the other hand, applies
161
to pretrial dispositions of all claims. The state legislature also
created the special motion to supplement its procedural rules and “to
162
provide added protections, beyond those in Rule[] 12.” The
legislature did not intend the special motion “to displace the Federal
163
Rules or have [them] cease to function.”
In finding no conflict between Rule 12 and the special motion,
the court also stressed the different mechanisms and procedural
burdens. It reasoned that Rule 12 and the special motion are both
“mechanisms to efficiently dispose with meritless claims before
164
trial.” However, the special motion provides a mechanism to
specifically test whether a defendant’s petitioning is the kind of
165
activity that Maine has deemed should be protected. In contrast,
Rule 12 provides a mechanism to test for the sufficiency of a case
158. Id. at 92. The court focused its analysis on both Rules 12 and 56, recognizing that
special motions can be limited to the pleadings or include matters presented outside the
pleadings. Id. at 87–91. In cases in which special motions are limited to the pleadings, the special
motions run up against Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which generally look only to the pleadings. See
id. at 90 (“Some Section 556 motions, like Rule 12(b)(6) motions, will be resolved on the
pleadings.” (footnote omitted)). In cases in which special motions include affidavits and limited
discovery outside the pleadings, the special motions run up against Rule 12(d) motions for
matters outside the pleadings, which trigger Rule 56 motions. See id. (“In other cases, Section
556 will permit courts to look beyond the pleadings to affidavits and materials of record, as Rule
56 does.”). For a discussion of the relationship between Rule 12(d) and Rule 56, see infra note
175.
159. Id. at 92. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that that there was appellate
jurisdiction over the procedural question at issue. Id. at 84–85. The court reserved the question
of whether there would be appellate jurisdiction over a ruling on the merits. Id. at 84.
160. Id. at 88.
161. See id. (“Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not purport to apply only to suits challenging the
defendants’ exercise of their constitutional petitioning rights.”).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also id. at 89 n.16 (“Such an abstracted framing of the breadth of the Federal
Rules is inappropriate.”).
165. Id. at 89.
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before trial and allows for dismissal if sufficiency is found to be
166
lacking. Moreover, unlike Rule 12, the special motion imposes a
higher onus on a plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s allegations about
a defendant’s conduct have a reasonable basis in law or fact, and that
167
the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury. Given these different
mechanisms and burdens, the court concluded that Rule 12 and the
special motion could “exist side by side” and each could “control[] its
168
own intended sphere of coverage.”
Continuing to draw from Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided
approach, the court emphasized that the special motion is inseparably
169
connected with state rights and remedies. The court did not
elaborate on what these rights are but suggested that they encompass
170
substantive state rights. As the court noted, if there were a conflict
between Rule 12 and the special motion, a “serious question might be
171
raised under the [REA]” and disregarding the special motion might
172
violate substantive state rights. Finally, the court emphasized that
failing to apply the special motion would result in an inequitable
administration of justice “between [the same] defense[s] asserted in
173
state court and . . . federal court” and could lead to forum shopping.
174
The court held that the special motion must apply in federal court.

166. See id. (“Rule 12(b)(6) serves to provide a mechanism to test the sufficiency of the
complaint. Section 556, by contrast, provides a mechanism for a defendant to move to dismiss a
claim on an entirely different basis: that the claims in question rest on the defendant’s protected
petitioning conduct and that the plaintiff cannot meet the special rules Maine has created to
protect such petitioning activity against lawsuits.” (citation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009))).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 91 (quoting United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190
F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)) (quotation mark omitted).
169. Id. at 91–92.
170. See id. at 91 (noting that the special motion “substantively alters Maine-law claims that
are based on a defendant’s protected petitioning activity by shifting the burden to the plaintiff
and altering the showing the plaintiff must make”).
171. Id. at 90.
172. See id. at 89 (“Because Section 556 is ‘so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule
12(b)(6).” (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423
(2011))).
173. Id. at 92.
174. Id. at 86.
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B. 3M Co. v. Boulter
Conversely, the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Boulter followed Justice Scalia’s really-regulates-procedure approach
to hold that the special motion conflicts with Rule 12, and that, given
175
its procedural characteristics, Rule 12 should apply in federal court.
Like Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the text of Rule 23 and the
New York law in Shady Grove, the court focused on the text of Rule
12 and the special motion and found that they address the same
176
subject matter—whether a defendant can dismiss a plaintiff’s claim.
Like Rule 12, the special motion “allows a defendant on a preliminary
basis to deal a deathly blow to a plaintiff’s claim on the merits based
177
either on the pleadings or on matters outside the pleadings.” The
court also recognized that the special motion imposes a higher
procedural burden on plaintiffs to show that “the plaintiff is more
178
likely than not to succeed on the merits.” The special motion thus
“restricts ‘the procedural right to maintain [an action]’ established by
179
180
the federal rules and squarely conflicts” with Rule 12.
After concluding that Rule 12 and the special motion conflict,
the court looked to whether Rule 12 was a valid exercise of authority
181
under the REA. The court stressed that pleading standards and
summary judgment rules are “classic examples of appropriate
182
183
procedural rules,” and Rule 12 thus really regulates procedure.
Straying slightly from Justice Scalia’s approach, the court also looked
to the purpose of the special motion. Without any meaningful
analysis, the court concluded that the special motion does not

175. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012). Like the First Circuit, the
court focused on Rule 12(b)(6) for motions to dismiss that are limited to the pleadings and Rule
12(d) motions to dismiss that include matters asserted outside the pleadings. Id. at 103. The
court devoted several pages to explaining that a 12(d) motion for matters outside the pleadings
is “treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 96–101.
176. Id. at 101–02.
177. Id. at 102.
178. Id. The court compared the procedural burden of the special motion to the burden of
Rule 56 motions (via 12(d) motions). Id. The court did not consider the burden of 12(b)(6)
motions, though it later paired Rule 12 and 56 motions together. Id.
179. Id. at 103 (first alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 401 n.4 (2011)).
180. Id. at 101.
181. Id. at 110–11.
182. Id. at 110.
183. See id. (“Given the procedural characteristics of Rule 12(d) and Rule 56, they fall
squarely within the proper scope of the Rules Enabling Act.”).
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“‘serve[] the function of defining [state] rights or remedies’” and is a
procedural rule “clothe[d] in the costume of the substantive right of
185
immunity.” Recognizing that this conclusion was contrary to the
186
weight of authority, the court nevertheless held that the special
187
motion does not apply in federal court.
***
Reconciling Godin and Boulter is difficult. In both cases, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made false statements against
them. Perhaps sympathies lie more with Godin, a fired elementaryschool principal, than 3M, a multinational company, but this should
not determinatively sway the outcome. The claims themselves are
comparable: Godin involved contract-interference and defamation
188
claims and Boulter involved a defamation claim. The state antiSLAPP laws are similar: both are grounded in First Amendment
rights and provide a mechanism to dismiss SLAPP suits early.
Moreover, both laws, upon a defendant’s motion, shift the burden
189
onto the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s claim is legally valid.
IV. CLARIFYING SHADY GROVE IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-SLAPP
LAWS
The puzzle thus becomes how to clarify the three opinions
articulated in Shady Grove to align with precedent and also provide
more guidance going forward. Drawing from the three respective
opinions in Shady Grove, this Part sets forth a more nuanced, twopronged interpretation for determining the applicability of state laws
in federal courts sitting in diversity.

184. Id. at 111 (second alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
185. Id.; see id. at 110–11 (“[T]he D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act is codified with procedural matters
in the D.C.Code [sic], and the Act applies to all claims, not just to claims brought under District
law, seriously undermining any contention that the Act ‘serves the function of defining [state]
rights or remedies.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432
(Stevens, J., concurring))).
186. See id. at 107–10 (distinguishing opinions from other courts, including the First Circuit
in Godin).
187. Id. at 111.
188. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010); Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
189. For a more extensive overview of the Maine and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP
special motion procedures, see supra Part I.C.
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The first prong of the interpretation focuses on textual conflict
between federal rules and state laws. When faced with a competing
federal rule and state law, courts should broadly construe the issue
before the court and compare, side by side, the text of the federal rule
and state law. Federal rules and state laws should be deemed to
conflict when the federal rule leaves no room for the operation of the
state law. This ensures that the issue will not be narrowly construed
and subsequently diverted toward the relatively unguided approach
instead of the REA inquiry. The second prong of the interpretation
focuses on the balancing of federal and state interests under the
REA. Once a conflict is deemed to exist, in determining the validity
of the federal rule, courts should look to the state’s purpose in
enacting the law. These state interests should weigh heavily but also
balance with the federal interest in creating a uniform system of
procedure. Unlike the Justices’ one-sided foci on either federal or
state interests in Shady Grove, this two-pronged interpretation
ensures that both federal and state interests are given fair and
balanced consideration.
This Part then uses this interpretation to determine how state
anti-SLAPP special motions should be treated in federal courts. The
text of Rule 12 and special motions are examined and the issue is
construed broadly, such that Rule 12 is deemed to conflict with the
special motions. Next, the state interests in enacting anti-SLAPP laws
and the federal interests in uniformity are balanced. The state
interests weigh more heavily than the federal interests, and thus,
special motions—not Rule 12—should apply in federal courts sitting
in diversity.
A. The First Prong: Textual Conflict
When faced with a federal rule and state law that are at odds, the
first inquiry should be whether the federal rule is “‘sufficiently broad’
to ‘control the issue’ before the court, ‘thereby leaving no room for
190
the operation’ of seemingly conflicting state law.” The three
opinions in Shady Grove agreed on this, yet disagreed as to how to
frame the issue and to discern the breadth of the federal rule. Broadly
construing the issue before the court and then comparing side by side
191
the “clear text” —rather than the underlying purposes of the federal
190. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)).
191. Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
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rule and state law—ensures that this first prong functions as a wide
funnel that feeds into the second prong (the REA inquiry).
Moreover, this shifts the bulk of the analysis—the purpose inquiry
and balancing of state and federal interests—onto the second prong
and enhances judicial economy.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Shady Grove broadly construed the
192
issue before the Court: when a class action can be certified. This is
consistent with prior cases in which the Court has dictated that
federal rules should not “be narrowly construed in order to avoid a
193
‘direct collision’ with state law.” Justice Scalia’s opinion held that
Rule 23 leaves no room for the operation of state law, as Rule 23
“unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil
194
proceeding, to maintain a class action.” This holding harkens back
195
to Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, in which the Court
emphasized that examining the text is a quick and efficient way to
compare state laws and federal rules. In Burlington, the Court parsed
196
the text of an Alabama law and Rule 38 to conclude that Rule 38’s
“discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the
197
mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty statute.”
Dissenting in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg narrowly construed
the issue before the Court to focus on the availability of remedies,
198
rather than certifying a class action. Justice Ginsburg looked to both
199
the text and the purpose of the New York law. As a result, this
strained interpretation skirted the REA inquiry and passed into the
200
relatively unguided approach in which the state law is applied if it
advances litigant equality and there is no countervailing federal
201
interest.

192. Id. at 398.
193. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S 460, 472 (1965)).
194. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406.
195. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
197. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 7.
198. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23 describes a
method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the New York law] defines the dimensions of the
claim itself.”).
199. Id.
200. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S 460, 471 (1965) (describing the Erie approach as
“relatively unguided”).
201. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

SANER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

11/13/2013 10:37 AM

STATE ANTI-SLAPP SPECIAL MOTIONS

809

It is far preferable to assess the validity of federal rules under the
REA, rather than the relatively unguided approach. Skirting the
REA for the relatively unguided approach encourages courts to
engage in clever interpretations that overweigh the true meaning of
state laws. When a federal rule and state law are deemed not to
202
conflict, the state regulatory interest almost always trumps. As one
commentator has noted, “The outcome of a[] . . . case should not
203
depend on how far the language of a statute can be stretched.”
These linguistic gymnastics can also twist the meaning of the federal
rules, and “[the federal rules] should not suffer contortion by
204
aggressively narrow readings.”
Moreover, conflating the text and purpose focuses prematurely
205
on the underlying state and federal interests. Focusing on these
policy considerations too early leads to a haphazard approach that “is
simply inadequate to protect substantive rights created by state
206
law.” As Justice Scalia cautioned in Shady Grove, it is difficult and
“arduous” for courts to discern all the state interests at this point in
207
the analysis. Looking into the minds of a legislature is taxing, and
208
pinpointing a single purpose for a state law can prove impossible.
There is no real necessity to wade into this purpose inquiry in the first
prong and identify some, but not all, of the state interests. At the
second prong, as discussed below, there is an aggressive examination
209
of the state and federal interests. In the interest of judicial economy
202. See infra notes 239–52.
203. Redfern, supra note 35, at 401.
204. Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
987, 1027 (2011).
205. Many past Supreme Court cases have narrowly interpreted the issue and mistakenly
combined a textual examination with the underlying purposes of the federal rule and state law.
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422–24 (1996) (failing to broadly
characterize the issue as the standard of review for an excessive jury award in assessing a
conflict between Rule 59 and a New York law); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742
(1980) (skewing the meaning of “commenced” in examining whether Rule 3 and an Oklahoma
law conflict).
206. Redfern, supra note 35, at 401; see Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418 (plurality opinion)
(stressing the Supreme Court’s “sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies”
(quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7) (quotation marks omitted)).
207. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 404.
208. See id. (“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict
based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce
‘confusion worse confounded.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
14 (1941))).
209. In this respect, this Note’s proposed two-pronged interpretation is somewhat analogous
to that of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
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it is preferable to create a firm line between the two prongs and
210
refrain from looking at the state and federal interests twice.
Thus, construing the issue broadly and examining only the text of
the federal rule and state law encourage assessment of the federal
rule under the REA, rather than the relatively unguided approach.
This also ensures that the bulk of the analysis occurs at the second
prong, enhancing judicial economy.
B. Applying the First Prong: Textual Conflict
Applying this first prong to state anti-SLAPP special motions, it
is undeniable that Rule 12 and special motions have different
breadths and procedural burdens that cause special motions to
conflict with Rule 12.
First, Rule 12 and special motions both provide for expedited
motions that test the legal sufficiency of a claim about a defendant’s
petitioning activity. Rule 12 indicates that a party, relying only on the
pleadings, may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon
211
which relief can be granted.” Similarly, special motions—specifically
the special motions in Maine and the District of Columbia—also
allow a party to move to dismiss if the claim is based on the
212
defendant’s exercise of her right to petition.
The First Circuit in Godin suggested that Rule 12 and special
motions could coexist, as one tests the sufficiency of all claims
whereas the other tests only whether a defendant’s petitioning

in the administrative law context. At the first prong, like in Chevron’s step one, the analysis is
purely textual. See id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear [from the statute], that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”). In contrast, at the second prong, like in Chevron’s step two, the
analysis engages other tools of statutory interpretation—purpose and legislative history—and is
more thorough. See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”). Admittedly, it can be difficult to look at a text in the abstract and
give it any definitive meaning without a purpositivist gloss. Courts have struggled with
delineating the Chevron line and undoubtedly could also struggle with delineating this proposed
two-pronged interpretation. See generally, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases,
121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 395 (2007) (criticizing the “mess” that Chevron has created).
210. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits
of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 977 (2011) (“The waters of Erie will never be crystal
clear . . . . But navigating them can be far simpler and more expeditious under the Shady Grove
plurality approach . . . .”).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
212. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2001 & Supp. 2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003
& Supp. 2012).
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213

activity should be protected. Broadly construed, the issue before the
court was whether a defendant can dismiss a plaintiff’s claim,
specifically a plaintiff’s claim about a defendant’s petitioning activity.
Rule 12 is sufficiently broad to control this issue. As in Shady Grove,
Rule 12 covers a much wider breadth than special motions. In Shady
Grove, the New York law applied only to some plaintiffs and Rule 23
214
applied to all plaintiffs. Here, the special motion applies only to
claims involving petitioning activity, and Rule 12 applies to all claims.
The all-encompassing federal rule thus swallows up the special
motions and prevents any coexistence. Rule 12 leaves no room for the
operation of special motions.
Second, beyond the breadth of Rule 12 and special motions, the
different procedural burdens of Rule 12 and special motions point
toward conflict. Rule 12 places the onus on the moving party to
demonstrate the legal insufficiency of the responding party’s claim—
215
that is, to show that the responding party has failed to state a claim.
Special motions shift this burden onto the nonmoving party (the
216
plaintiff) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of her claim. As the
District Court in Boulter noted, the burden shift in the special motion
“restricts ‘the procedural right to maintain [an action]’ established by
217
the federal rules.” These different procedural burdens preclude the
coexistence of Rule 12 and the special motions.
Thus, adhering to the text and broadly construing the issue
before the court, lower courts should deem that Rule 12 conflicts with
state anti-SLAPP special motions. Rule 12 casts a wider net over the
issue before the court, and the different procedural burdens of Rule
12 and special motions point toward conflict.

213. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Rule 12(b)(6) serves to provide
a mechanism to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Section 556, by contrast, provides a
mechanism for a defendant to move to dismiss a claim on an entirely different basis . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
214. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co, 559 U.S. 393, 396–98
(2010) (noting that Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the
specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action,” whereas the “New York law prohibits
class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages”).
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
216. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.
217. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2012) (alteration in original)
(quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 401 n.4).

SANER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

812

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/13/2013 10:37 AM

[Vol. 63:781

C. The Second Prong: Balancing State and Federal Interests
Once a conflict is determined, the bulk of the analysis should
address the validity of the federal rule under the REA. The REA
grants the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general [federal]
218
rules of practice and procedure” but stipulates that the federal rules
219
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Rather
than characterizing federal rules as procedural or substantive, it is
useful to look at the REA as a balancing of state and federal interests:
a respect for state regulatory policies balanced with the desire for a
uniform system of federal procedure. Balancing tests are neither
220
perfect, nor equipped to provide bright-line rules.
They do,
however, allow for flexibility and ensure adequate protection for
continually evolving substantive rights.
Characterizing federal rules and state laws as either procedural
or substantive, as Justices Scalia and Stevens do in Shady Grove, does
not provide much guidance in determining the validity of the federal
221
rule. On a broad level, a substantive law is one that affects rights,
remedies, and the outcome of lawsuits, whereas a procedural rule
enforces the rights and remedies recognized by substantive law. Yet,
“[t]he line between procedural [rules] and substantive law[s] is
222
hazy” as “matters of substance and . . . matters of procedure [are]
difficult to distinguish and the two are not mutually exclusive
223
categories.” Procedural rules invariably affect the outcome of

218. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
219. Id. § 2072(b).
220. As mentioned above, see supra note 25, courts engage in a balancing of state and
federal interests when there is no conflict between a federal rule or practice and a state law, and
the federal rule or practice involves a countervailing federal policy. Many commentators have
criticized this balancing test because it produces confusing results. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 404–05 (6th ed. 2002) (“[T]here was
considerable difficulty in applying the [balancing] test . . . stem[ming] from the fact that there is
no scale . . . to say with assurance in a particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or
less important than the interest in preserving uniformity of result with the state court.”); Ely,
supra note 33, at 709 (explaining that “lower courts . . . experienced considerable difficulty in
applying” the balancing test set forth in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356
U.S. 525 (1958)).
221. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (struggling to delineate
“procedural” from “substantive”); Debra Lyn Bassett, Enabling the Federal Rules, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 9 (2010) (noting that no definitive line exists “between matters of
substantive law and matters of procedural law”).
222. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
223. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 419–21 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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lawsuits, and all procedural rules are arguably bound up in
224
substantive rights. A state anti-SLAPP special motion, for example,
can be characterized as either procedural or substantive.
Procedurally, it provides a quick means of dismissal. Substantively, it
protects defendants from burdensome litigation and encourages
public participation in speech and petitioning activities.
Recognizing this conundrum, many commentators have
advocated Justice Harlan’s alternative understanding of a substantive
225
law. Harlan argued that a law was substantive if it affected “primary
226
activity” outside the context of litigation —that is, if it affected the
227
way people lived their day-to-day lives. This understanding does not
help much in differentiating substantive laws from procedural rules.
Arguably, all procedural rules affect “primary activity.” For example,
a statute of limitations could be characterized as a procedural rule. If
a plaintiff is severely injured and does not file within the statute of
limitations, this could affect the plaintiff’s current financial situation
(if she has to pay for medical expenses) and future income potential
(if she can no longer work). Not filing the lawsuit thus affects her
“primary activity.” Similarly, one commentator has pointed out that a
rule requiring eight-by-fourteen-inch paper for pleadings and
motions, rather than eight-by-eleven-inch paper, might appear
228
procedural on its face.
Yet, the size of the paper changes
entitlements and values. The larger paper might be more expensive,
or less sophisticated litigants might be unaware of the
unconventional-size requirement such that substantive rights are
229
affected.

224. See Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State Civil
Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 984 (2009)
(signaling a “[r]ecognition of the power of procedure to advance substantive agendas”). But see
Ely, supra note 33, at 724 (“We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of
the line between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry no
monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to
employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning at all.” (footnote omitted)).
225. See, e.g., Darrell N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of
Erie, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 403, 442–44 (1989) (advocating Justice Harlan’s view of substantive
laws).
226. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
227. See Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1171 (“Justice Harlan appeared to view rules as
substantive if they affect the way people live their day-to-day lives and conduct their worldly
affairs in light of the law . . . .”).
228. Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (2011).
229. Id.
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Moving beyond the confusing labels of procedural and
substantive, the REA is better viewed as a balancing of federal and
state interests. The REA encourages uniform federal procedure in
granting Congress full “power to prescribe general [federal] rules
230
of . . . procedure.” It then takes away some of this power and
refuses to permit federal rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any
231
substantive right.” The REA thus tempers the federal interest in
uniformity with a respect for state regulatory policies. Moreover,
whereas Justices Scalia and Stevens characterized state laws and
federal rules as procedural or substantive in Shady Grove, they in fact
agreed, albeit subtly, that balancing state and federal interests was the
232
“proper technique” in assessing the validity of a federal rule.
Despite this agreement on balancing state and federal interests
as the “proper technique,” both Justices Scalia and Stevens failed to
233
give meaningful consideration to the state interests. Justice Scalia
looked solely at the federal rules and found them valid if they “really
234
regulate[] procedure.” This procedural test ignores the REA’s
limitation that federal rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify any
235
substantive right.” Justice Stevens adhered more closely to the text
of the REA and read its two requirements together, such that federal
236
He
rules cannot be “so intertwined with . . . state right[s].”
purported to focus on state laws and their relationship to state
237
“substantive rights or remedies.” With hesitation, Justice Stevens
noted that seemingly procedural rules—such as state laws that make
it more difficult to bring or prove a claim, or define the amount of
recovery—might be “bound up with . . . state-created right[s] [and]

230. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
231. Id. § 2072(b).
232. Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1199–1200; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 424–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting “the
balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a
State’s construction of its own rights and remedies”).
233. See Bauer, supra note 38, at 955 (criticizing Justice Scalia in Shady Grove for
“dismiss[ing states’ rulemaking roles] with the back of [his] hand by his singular adoption of a
federal standard to characterize the state law”); Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1203 (criticizing
Justice Stevens in Shady Grove and noting that “[a]sking only whether a rule may have a
substantive effect is not helpful”).
234. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 14 (1941)) (quotation marks omitted).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
236. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 419.
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remed[ies].” Yet, like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens failed to give
much meaningful weight to the state interests.
Several past Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that this
balance ought to include a greater emphasis on state law. Although
the Court has not yet invalidated a federal rule that conflicts with a
239
state law, the Court has suggested several times that certain federal
240
rules might violate state substantive rights and thus be invalid. In
241
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court
242
considered how dismissals under Rule 41(b) foreclose future
litigation, whereas under California law dismissals do not foreclose
243
future litigation. The Court held that there was no conflict between
Rule 41(b) and the California law, but that, if there were a conflict,
244
Rule 41(b) “would seem to violate” substantive rights. Similarly, in
245
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., the Court noted that
246
reading Rule 23.1 as imposing a requirement on plaintiffs to seek
direct relief from a corporation’s directors would violate substantive
247
rights. The Court has thus expressed some willingness to defer to
248
state substantive rights and invalidate federal rules.
238. Id. at 420; see also id. at 425 n.9 (“For example, statutes of limitations, although in some
sense procedural rules, can also be understood as a temporal limitation on legally created rights;
if this Court were to promulgate a federal limitations period, federal courts would still, in some
instances, be required to apply state limitations periods.”).
239. See id. at 407 (plurality opinion) (noting that upon finding conflict between a federal
rule and state law, the Supreme Court has “rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule
that has come before [it]”).
240. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 273 (“Supreme Court decisions in the last decade or so
suggest that the substantive-rights provision may be a more robust check on federal rulemaking
than it appeared to be for most of the twentieth century.”); see also Bauer, supra note 38, at 985
(“The values which are reflected in the Erie doctrine, and in particular the importance of
federalism, will be enhanced if the Court would take seriously, rather than merely pay lipservice to, the agreed benefits of identifying, and then deferring to, state interests.”).
241. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
242. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
243. Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at 502–04.
244. Id. at 503–04.
245. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
246. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1
247. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96–97 (“In our view, the function of the demand doctrine in
delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control
corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’”).
248. See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–85 (2001) (suggesting that the no
opt-out provision in Rule 23(b)(1)(B) would violate substantive state rights). In addition,
several commentators have argued that federal summary-judgment and pleading standards have
legal consequences that might violate substantive state rights. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 33,
at 287–88 (“[A]t least in certain situations, current federal approaches to [motions for summary
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Moreover, as discussed above, the Court has often narrowly
interpreted the issue to avoid conflict between the federal rule and
249
state law. This pushes resolution into the relatively unguided
approach and typically shows the Court’s inclination toward deferring
250
to state interests over federal interests. In addition, as states have
251
engaged in more litigation reform, the Court has arguably paid
more heed to state substantive rights that intersect with procedural
252
mechanisms.
Taking this willingness to defer to state substantive rights into
consideration, courts should give teeth to Justice Stevens’s statecentric, sufficiently interwoven approach and should fully consider
the state’s purpose in enacting the law, including an examination of
the broader context against which the law was enacted. This is not to
suggest that any law a state passes presumptively affects substantive
state rights. With such a broad conception, all state laws would
swallow the federal rules. Rather, it is imperative that there be an
equitable balance among the interests of the state laws and federal
rules. Deference to state rulemaking roles and the traditional goals of
equitable administration should weigh heavily but also balance with
federal concerns of uniformity.
In terms of state interests, states enact laws to regulate behavior
and protect the substantive rights of their citizens. Without the ability
to legislate, there are few other avenues for states to protect their
citizens. Emphasizing the importance of state rulemaking in our
federal system, the Court has cautioned that federal rules should

judgment and pleading standards] impermissibly ‘abridge, enlarge or modify . . . substantive
right[s]’ created by state law.” (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006))). But see, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in
the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2010) (arguing that it is “difficult to imagine
that the Supreme Court would invalidate [federal summary judgment standards]”).
249. See supra Part IV.A.
250. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1996) (holding
that there was no conflict between Rule 59 and a New York law on the standard for reviewing
excessive jury awards and concluding that the New York law applied).
251. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 693–94 (1993)
(defining litigation reform as “the means by which aspects of the litigation process, including
adjudicatory procedure, are altered, marginalized, reduced in importance, bypassed, eliminated
or changed”).
252. See John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform
Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 295–300 (2008) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s response to litigation reform in Gasperini).
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In
“avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.”
addition, the Court has stressed the importance of applying state law
to avoid inequity in the administration of laws and to discourage
254
forum shopping. Given the prevalence of removal from state courts
to federal courts, it is likely that a lawsuit may start out in state court
255
and quickly move to federal court. If the state court and federal
court apply different laws, a litigant may obtain a different outcome
256
in state court as opposed to in federal court in the same state. This is
unfair to the litigant, and tends to encourage plaintiffs to forum shop
or file in a jurisdiction more favorable to plaintiffs. Even though
perhaps there are federal interests in avoiding inequity in the
257
administration of laws and discouraging forum shopping, the
resulting disparities are “precisely what obligate federal courts to
258
adopt state-court practices.”
Although courts should heavily weigh this deference to state
rulemaking authority and states’ desire for the equitable
administration of laws, courts should also consider the federal interest
in creating a uniform system of procedural rules. The FRCP were
enacted to coordinate procedure in federal courts and automatically
apply in “all civil actions and proceedings in the [federal] district
259
courts.” Stemming from this, Justice Scalia stressed the importance

253. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 593
(6th ed. 2009) (observing that “the Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has interpret[ed] the
federal rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies”).
254. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
255. See Jill Curray & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File?
A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 866–70 (2013)
(analyzing the increase in removal from state to federal courts after Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
256. See Lynch, supra note 252, at 327 (“A would-be plaintiff should not be able to frustrate
a state’s attempts to address its own problems in its own way by moving across a state line to
create diversity.”); Steinman, supra note 33, at 251–52 (noting that applying different rules in
federal and state courts “leads to precisely the kind of forum shopping that Erie is supposed to
forbid—plaintiffs craft lawsuits with an eye toward keeping them in state court, and defendants
strive mightily to justify removal of such lawsuits to federal court”).
257. See generally Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1865 (2013) (arguing that the twin aims of Erie serve federal jurisdictional goals).
258. Steinman, supra note 33, at 252 (emphasis omitted); see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stressing the importance of reducing inequality and noting that the
“outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be
if tried in a State court”).
259. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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of efficient and predictable federal procedure in Shady Grove.
These are important considerations, but the FRCP were not exacted
as the sole means of procedure. Federal uniformity interests are
insufficient to justify application in all cases and must give way when
they impinge upon state substantive rights. As a result, the FRCP—
261
and federal rules generally—tolerate much interstate variation.
Thus, in considering whether a federal rule abridges, enlarges, or
modifies
a
state
right,
courts
should
abandon
the
procedural/substantive distinction and fully consider the state’s
purpose in enacting laws. The state’s interests in protecting its
citizenry and equitably administering laws should weigh heavily,
especially when state constitutional rights are implicated. The state
interests should also balance with the desire for a uniform system of
federal procedure.
D. Applying the Second Prong: Balancing State and Federal Interests
Applying this second prong to state anti-SLAPP special motions,
the state interests in enacting anti-SLAPP laws weigh more heavily
than the federal interests. State anti-SLAPP laws are much more than
procedural rules “clothe[d] in the costume of the substantive right of
262
immunity.” Rather, anti-SLAPP laws and their accompanying
special motions represent a deliberate choice to protect against
litigation of meritless claims and to encourage freedom of speech.
Thus, there are three reasons that special motions should apply in
federal courts sitting in diversity.
First, states adopt anti-SLAPP laws to prevent ongoing litigation
with no end goal. As discussed above, the SLAPP filer is not seeking
a legal or equitable remedy but intends to silence and harass the
263
defendant for speaking out. The “David and Goliath power

260. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010)
(“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the
subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion
worse confounded.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941))).
261. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied
Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1227 (2011) (“[T]he
myriad local rules dealing with topics from the trivial to the vital suggest that the federal court
system already tolerates a considerable amount of interstate and even intrastate variation.”).
262. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012) (drawing the opposite
conclusion).
263. See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text.
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between the parties oftentimes leads to financial
difference”
bullying in which the defendant is forced to devote proportionally
265
more resources and time to litigation than the plaintiff. AntiSLAPP laws work to counteract this, with special motions that allow
defendants to quickly dispense of meritless SLAPP suits. As the
Boulter court recognized, “There is no question that the special
266
motion . . . operates greatly to a defendant’s benefit.” Even if antiSLAPP laws relieve some defendants of liability for which they are
267
truly culpable, in enacting anti-SLAPP laws, state legislatures have
prioritized the prevention of unnecessary financial cost, as well as the
immeasurable loss to a defendant’s reputation and the psychological
268
trauma of navigating the judicial system. As the Council of the
District of Columbia Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary
reported, anti-SLAPP laws are intended to “incorporat[e] substantive
rights that allow a defendant to more expeditiously, and more
269
equitably, dispense of a SLAPP.”
Second, states adopt anti-SLAPP special motions to encourage
protected speech. The rights to free speech and petition, including the
ability to engage in public debate and participate in government, are
270
fundamental to preserving individual liberty and democracy. On a
national level, these rights are safeguarded in the First Amendment.
Americans expect that when someone speaks out and expresses an
unpopular or controversial opinion, there is a “national commitment”
271
that this speech “should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”

264. Stuborn Ltd. P’ship. v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003).
265. See supra notes 47–50, 55–56 and accompanying text.
266. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d. at 102.
267. See Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment
Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 633 (1998) (arguing that
it is “illogical and inequitable to grant one right to [one party at] the exclusion of another
[party]”).
268. See generally MICHELANGELO DELFINO & MARY E. DAY, BE CAREFUL WHO YOU
SLAPP (2002) (describing the psychological impact of a SLAPP suit on two self-employed
research scientists).
269. See Memorandum from Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of the D.C. Comm. on
Public Safety and the Judiciary, to Councilmembers, Council of D.C., supra note 91, at 2
(emphasis added).
270. See Barylak, supra note 57, at 845 (stressing public participation as essential to
safeguarding liberty and “resolv[ing] . . . broad social problems”).
271. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also FIONA J.L.
DONSON, LEGAL INTIMIDATION: A SLAPP IN THE FACE OF DEMOCRACY 1 (2000) (“The right
to free expression suggests that those who challenge both government and corporate policies
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This protected speech is undermined and public participation is
thwarted when wealth dominates access to government and the
272
ability to question and criticize is silenced. Most state constitutions
derive from the First Amendment similar rights to free speech and
petition. For example, the Maine Constitution sets forth that “[t]he
people have a right . . . to request, of either department of the
government by petition or remonstrance, redress of their wrongs or
273
grievances.” SLAPP suits, in which the wealthy seek to quell this
protected speech, thus run contrary to the core rights embodied in the
First Amendment and many state constitutions.
This second goal distinguishes anti-SLAPP special motions from
the New York law addressing class certification in Shady Grove.
Whereas the New York law in Shady Grove involved the efficiency of
274
litigation, special motions involve not only efficiency but also the
constitutional rights to free speech and petition. As such, the state has
an even more compelling rationale for enacting anti-SLAPP special
motions. More so than in Shady Grove, disregarding these state
275
interests “encroaches dangerously on state sovereignty.” As the
First Circuit conjectured in Godin, such disregard raises “a serious
276
question . . . under the [REA].”
Third, applying anti-SLAPP special motions in state court but
not in federal court would lead to an inequitable administration of
277
laws and would encourage forum shopping. The First Circuit
expressed this concern in Godin and noted that failing to apply the
special motion would result in an inequitable administration of justice
“between [the same] defense[s] asserted in state court and . . . federal
278
court” and could lead to forum shopping. This concern came to

should have the full protection of the law, so long as they express their opposition in a way that
does not harm competing interests.”).
272. See Braun, supra note 43, at 971–72 (“Institutions such as a free press and a reasonably
neutral government do not work if people are afraid to use them.”).
273. ME. CONST. art. I, § 15.
274. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 402 (2010)
(noting that the New York law was designed to address “whether a class action may be
maintained”).
275. Litwiller, supra note 36, at 95.
276. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 90 (1st Cir. 2010).
277. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Plainly, if the anti-SLAPP provisions are held not to apply in federal
court, a litigant interested in bringing meritless SLAPP claims would have a significant incentive
to shop for a federal forum.”).
278. Godin, 629 F.3d at 92.
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fruition after Boulter. The plaintiffs in Dean v. NBC Universal
voluntarily dismissed their case after initially filing in the District of
280
Columbia Superior Court. The plaintiffs then refiled in federal
court, with the knowledge that Boulter did not permit anti-SLAPP
281
special motions in federal court. When special motions apply in one
court but not in another, states are put in a hard place; the state’s
ability to effectively legislate and protect against SLAPP suits within
that state is drastically reduced.
Overall, states have a strong interest in protecting their citizens
against SLAPP suits and equitably administering laws. The interest is
particularly strong when the state law is grounded in state
constitutional rights. Federal uniformity concerns do not supersede
these strong state interests. On balance, the compelling state interest
in protecting citizens and equitably administering laws weighs more
heavily than federal uniformity concerns. Thus, Rule 12, as applied to
state anti-SLAPP specials motions, should be invalidated as
abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive state rights.
CONCLUSION
The three opinions in Shady Grove provide significant insight,
but not much guidance to lower courts in resolving whether state law
or federal law applies in federal courts sitting in diversity. As a result,
the First Circuit in Godin and the District Court for the District of
Columbia in Boulter employed different approaches and came to
different conclusions. In Godin, the Maine anti-SLAPP special
motion applied in federal court whereas in Boulter, the District of
Columbia special motion did not apply in federal court.
Drawing on the diverging approaches in Shady Grove, this Note
has attempted to clarify this confusion and advocate a more nuanced,
two-pronged interpretation for determining the applicability of state
laws in federal courts sitting in diversity. Under this interpretation,
anti-SLAPP special motions—not Rule 12—should apply in federal
courts. Special motions, like Rule 12, permit expedited review of the
legal validity of a plaintiff’s claim. There is invariable textual conflict

279. Dean v. NBC Universal, No. 1:12-cv-00283 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 21, 2012).
280. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Dean v. NBC Universal, No.
1:12-cv-00283 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 15, 2012) (requesting voluntary dismissal without
prejudice because “[t]he Complaint has been re-filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia due to the Court’s recent decision in 3M v. Boulter”).
281. See id.
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between Rule 12 and the special motions. Moreover, the special
motions implicate substantive state rights. State legislatures, in
enacting special motions, have granted heightened protection to
defendants and consciously prioritized the defendant’s right to free
speech over the plaintiff’s right of access to the judicial system.
Although only time will tell how the Supreme Court will
interpret Shady Grove going forward, or how state legislatures might
change anti-SLAPP laws, one hopes that two nearly identical state
laws implicating substantive rights would apply with equal force in the
federal courts of both states.

